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Recent Decisions

When a State Seizes Property During a Criminal
Investigation, Due Process Requires Notice that the
Property was Seized, But Does Not Require Detailed
Notice of Post-Seizure Remedies: City of West
Covina v. Perkins
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

PROCEDURAL

DUE

PROCESS -

SEARCHES AND

The Supreme Court of the United States held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state
or its local entities to provide notice that property was seized
during a criminal investigation, but does not require a state to
provide specific instructions or advice to owners who seek the
return of property that was lawfully seized but no longer needed
for police investigation or criminal prosecution.
SEIZURES -

City of West Covina v. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. 678 (1999).
While conducting a lawful search in the home of Lawrence
Perkins, police officers from the City of West Covina ("City") seized
personal property that belonged to Perkins and members of his
family.' No one was home during the search. 2 In accordance with a
valid search warrant, the police officers were searching for
evidence that would incriminate a man named Marcus Marsh, who
had previously resided in Perkins' home as a boarder. 3 After leaving
the Perkins home, Marsh became the subject of a homicide
4
investigation, a fact of which Perkins and his family were unaware.
1. City of West Covina v. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. 678, 679 (1999).
2. Perkins v. City of West Covina, 113 F3d 1004, 1006 (9th Cir. 1997). The house was
left in disarray, with damage to the doors and some personal items. Id. at 1007.
3. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 679.
4. Id.
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At the conclusion of the search, the police officers left a form
entitled "Search Warrant: Notice of Service" at the Perkins home.5
Consistent with this notice, the police officers gave Perkins an
enumerated list of all the seized property.6 The search warrant had
been sealed to refrain from compromising an open investigation;
therefore, the notice that property was seized did not include the
search warrant number.7 However, a court clerk later recorded the
issuance of the warrant in the public index by both the address of
the searched home and the search warrant number.8
Shortly after the search, Perkins contacted one of the police
officers regarding the return of the seized property.9 The police
instructed Perkins to obtain a court order authorizing the property's
return. 10 One month after the search, Perkins went to see Judge
Old, who issued the search warrant, at the Citrus Municipal Court."
Perkins was told that Judge Old was on vacation. 2 When Perkins
attempted to have another judge release his property, he was told
the court was holding no property under his name.1 3 Instead of
filing a written motion with the court to pursue the court order
relinquishing the property, making any other inquiries, or later
returning to the courthouse, Perkins filed a 42 U.S.C. § 198314
5. Id. The search warrant authorized a search of "all rooms, attics, basements,
garages, and other parts therein." Perkins, 113 F3d at 1006. Four addresses were listed on
the warrant, including the home address of Perkins. Id. The search warrant allowed a search
for "any evidence of street gang membership or affiliation with a street gang," and "any
firearms of the following caliber 9MM." Id.
6. Id. at 680. "During the search, the officers seized gang photos (some depicting
Marsh), paperwork belonging to Marsh, and an address book belonging to Lawrence
Perkins." Perkins, 113 F3d at 1006. A twelve-gauge shotgun, several forms of ammunition, a
starter pistol and $2,469 in cash Were also seized. Id.
7. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 680. The notice stated:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: THESE PREMISES HAVE BEEN SEARCHED BY
PEACE OFFICERS OF THE West Covina Police DEPARTMENT PURSUANT TO A
SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED ON 5-20-93, BY THE HONORABLE Dan Old, JUDGE OF
THE SUPERIOR/MUNICIPAL COURT, Citrus JUDICIAL DISTRICT. THE SEARCH WAS
CONDUCTED ON 5-21-93. A LIST OF THE PROPERTY SEIZED PURSUANT TO THE
SEARCH WARRANT IS ATTACHED. IF YOU WISH FURTHER INFORMATION, YOU
MAY CONTRACT: Det. Ferrari or Det. Melnyk AT [telephone number].
The form included the name Lt. Schimanski and his telephone number as well. Id. at 679-80.
8. Id. at 680.
9. Id. Perkins contacted Detective Ferrari, who was one of the detectives listed on the
notice. Id.
10. Perkins, 113 F3d at 1007.
11. Id. at 1006-07.
12. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 680.
13. Id.
14. Perkins, 113 F3d at 1006. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
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lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District
of California against the City.' 5 Perkins' complaint alleged that the
police officers violated his Fourth Amendment 6 rights by
conducting the search without probable cause and by exceeding
the scope of the search warrant. '
The district court granted the City's motion for summary
judgment.' 8 Perkins was, however, permitted to raise in a
supplemental brief the issue of whether the available California
remedies for the return of seized property were adequate to satisfy
the procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 9 The district court requested supplemental briefs on
that issue but failed to make a decision.20 Perkins appealed to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals who remanded the resolution of the
due process issue to the district court.2 ' On remand, the district
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). This section does not create any substantive rights, but rather,
provides a procedural redress for deprivation of rights established elsewhere. See Sykes v.
James, 13 F.3d 515 (2nd Cir. 1993). Section 1983 simply creates a cause of action. Hanson v.
Town of Flower Mound, 679 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1982).
15. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 680. Perkins' complaint stated that his rights under both the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated because of the police officers' "arbitrary
intrusion . . . into the security of [Perkins'] privacy" and their subsequent search without
probable cause. Perkins, 113 E3d at 1007. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from
unreasonable searches. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
relevant part that a state shall not deprive a person of "life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1, cl. 2. Perkins complaint further purported that
the City had a policy of allowing unlawful searches. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 680.
16. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 680.
18. Id. Summary judgment is a judgment granted on a claim for which "there is no
genuine issue of material fact" and upon which the movant "is entitled to prevail as a matter
of law." BLAcK's LAW DIcTONARY 1435 (6th ed. 1990). Here, summary judgment was granted on
the claim that the warrant lacked probable cause. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 680.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Perkins, 113 F3d at 1014.
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court again granted the City's motion for summary judgment and
held that California's remedies for the return of seized property
satisfy due process. 22 Perkins appealed, arguing that the California
procedures for the restoration of seized property were not available
to him because the City failed to give him sufficient notice of the
2
remedy and the information required to implement the remedy. 3
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision
to grant the City's motion for summary judgment. 24 The court held
that California remedies for the retrieval of seized property met the
Fourteenth Amendment requirements of due process. 25 However,
relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Memphis
Light, Gas and Water Division. v. Craft,26 the court held that the
City had an obligation to provide Perkins with notice of the state
procedures for the return of seized property and the information
necessary to invoke the process. 27 Although the court specified that
it had no duty to provide the precise phrasing of a sufficient notice,
it gave a detailed description of what the required notice should
28
include.
22. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 680. The post-deprivation remedy provided for under the
California statute provides:
[All property or things taken on a warrant must be retained by the officer in his
custody, subject to the order of the court to which he is required to return the
proceedings before him, or of any other court in which the offense in respect to
which property or things taken is triable.
CAL PENAL CODE § 1536 (West 1982). When the district court granted summary judgment, it
also noted that case law has clearly established that "both during and after pendency of a
criminal action, section 1536 empowers the court to entertain a summary proceeding by
'nonstatutory' motion for the release of property seized under a search warrant." Perkins,
113 F.3d at 1011 (citing People v. Icenogle, 164 Cal. App. 3d 620, 623 (1985)).
23. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 680. The information that Perkins claimed he was missing
was the correct search warrant number or a method to obtain the correct number. Id. at 683.
24. Perkins, 113 F.3d. at 1006. The court noted that under Fuentes v. Shevin, Perkins
was entitled only to an adequate post-deprivation remedy, and not to a pre-deprivation
hearing. Perkins, 113 F.3d. at 1010 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)).
25. Id. at 1011.
26. 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
27. Perkins, 113 F.3d at 1012 (citing Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436
U.S. 1 (1978)). The court also noted that such information should include the search warrant
number or a manner to obtain the number. Id.
28. Id. at 1013. The court illustrated that
In cases where property is taken under California Law... the notice should include
the following: as on the present notice, the fact of the search, its date, and the
searching agency; the date of the warrant, the issuing judge, and the court in which
he or she serves; and the persons to be contacted for further information. In addition,
the notice must inform the recipient of the procedure for contesting the seizure or
retention of the property taken, along with any additional information required for
initiating that procedure in the appropriate court. In circumstances such as those
presented by this record, the notice must include the search warrant number or, if it
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The United States Supreme Court granted the City's petition for
certiorari 29 to determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution "requires a state or its local entities to
give detailed and specific instructions or advice to owners who
seek the return of their property lawfully seized but no longer
needed for police investigation or criminal prosecution." 30
The majority of the Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which imposed a series of specific notice
requirements on the city responsible for the seizure, and reversed. 3'
The majority began its opinion by clarifying the issue of the case
as involving a state's obligation to provide fair procedures regarding
the return of property when the state no longer has a lawful right
to retain it.32 As a threshold matter, the Court held that when a law
enforcement agency seizes a person's property in accordance with
a search warrant, the Due Process Clause requires the agency to
make a reasonable effort to give the owner notice of the seizure,
thus allowing the owner to pursue available means of retrieving the
property.3 Such notice satisfies the principal purpose of the notice
aspect of procedural due process, which is to ensure a meaningful
opportunity for a hearing.34 The Court stressed that absent
individualized notice that police officers have seized property, the
owner has no means of determining who was responsible;
therefore, the owner has no meaningful opportunity to pursue
is not available or the record is sealed, the means of identifying the court file. It must
also explain the need for a written motion or request to the court stating why the
property should be returned.
Id.
29. Certiorari is
[a] writ of common law origin issued by a superior to an inferior court requiring the
latter to produce a certified record of a particular case tried therein.... [The term is]
[miost commonly used to refer to the Supreme Court of the United States, which uses
the writ of certiorari as a discretionary device to choose the cases it wishes to hear.
BLACK's LAW DIcIoNARY 228 (6th ed. 1990).
30. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 679.
31. Id. The majority opinion was delivered by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Justice
Thomas fied a concurring opinion in which Justice Scalia joined. Id.
32. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 681. None of the parties disputed the state's right to seize the
property or its obligation to return the seized property. Id.
33. Id. (citing Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 214 (1962)). In Schroeder,
the city had reproached particular water rights, thereby creating the property owner's right
to seek damage claims, as well as triggering the statute of limitations for such claims.
Schroeder, 371 U.S. at 214.
34. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 681 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950)).
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post-seizure remedies. 35
The Court next addressed Perkins' argument that the City denied
him due process by failing to provide detailed notice of his
post-seizure remedies. 36 Distinguishing between notice that property
was seized and notice of available post-seizure remedies, the
majority held that the "meaningful opportunity" rationale for the
notice aspect of due process does not require a state to publish its
post-seizure remedies beyond the publication in state statutes and
case law.37 Once the property has been seized, the burden is on the
property owner to turn to public sources for information regarding
the procedures available, rather than the state being required to
provide the same information to the property owner.38 The majority
stated that in prior cases involving post-deprivation, state law
remedies have been held to be sufficient for due process, and the
cases have never required a state to provide further information
regarding those procedures. 39
The Court found the Ninth Circuit's invocation of Memphis Light
to be rather far reaching. 40 Although Memphis Light illustrates that
post-seizure notice of the process necessary for the recovery of
one's property may be warranted when such a process is
antiquated and not easily accessible to the public, the majority
found that Memphis Light does not support the notion that such
notice is generally required. 41 The Court limited Memphis Light to
its facts, and held that it does not stand for the general principle
that the government must provide detailed notice of available
42
post-seizure procedures to protect one's property interest.
The majority opinion explained that the Ninth Circuit's decision
conflicts with the well-established practices of the state and federal
35.

Id.

36.
37.

Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 681-82.
Id. at 682.

38.

Id.

39. Id. (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 571 (1984)).
40. Id. The Memphis Light Court held that "a public utility must make available to its
customers the opportunity to discuss a billing dispute with a utility employee who has the
authority to resolve the matter before terminating utility service for nonpayment." Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1978). The Memphis Light Court further
held that "due process required the utility to inform the customer not only of the planned
termination, but also of the availability and general contours of the internal administrative
process for resolving the accounting dispute." Id. at 13-15.
41. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 682.
42. Id. The administrative procedure involved in Memphis was not described in any
document available to the public. Id. Even if a customer had notice of the termination of his
service, he could not be reasonably expected to educate himself on the appropriate
procedures to protect his interest. Id.
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governments regarding what types of notice these two entities
require their law enforcement agencies to provide. 43 Analyzing
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(d) 44 as an example, which
dictates the notice requirements when federal agents seize
property, the Court found no provision for notifying property
owners of the process to have their property returned to them;
therefore, the Ninth Circuit's determination would render not only
this rule, but also every similar state statute and rule,
constitutionally unsound. 45 In order for the Supreme Court to
sustain the Ninth Circuit's ruling, it "would be required to find that
due process requires notice that not one State or the Federal
46
Government has seen fit to require."
As a final matter, Perkins contended that if the Supreme Court
refused to uphold the Ninth Circuit's notice of post-seizure remedy
requirement, it should at least uphold the Ninth Circuit's
determination that Perkins' notice of seizure was inadequate
because his notice of seizure did not include a search warrant
number. 47 However, the Court found that the district court's factual
findings did not support the proposition that a search warrant
48
number is imperative for the retrieval of seized property.
Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that Perkins' alternative
49
argument was weakened, and no longer an issue.
Justices Thomas and Scalia agree with the majority's opinion that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
43. Id.
44. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d). This rule requires federal agents seizing property according
to a search warrant to "give to the person from whom or from whose premises the property
was taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken or [to] leave the copy
and the receipt at the place from which the property was taken." Id.
45. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 682-83.
46. Id. at 683. The court stressed that these law enforcement concepts have existed for
centuries. Id. In an appendix, the Court provided a comprehensive list of federal and state
laws governing execution of search warrants and procedures for the return of seized
property. Id., App. at 683-84.
47. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that Perkins' notice of seizure was held to be inadequate
because Perkins was not provided with specific factual information or the search warrant
number, which was necessary to invoke judicial remedies. Id. The factual findings of the
district court did reveal that Perkins failed to show he needed the search warrant number to
fie a motion in court seeking the repossession of property. Id. The City asserted that the
warrant number was not necessary Id. In California, if the claimant can accurately identify
his property, such as by providing the date of the warrant, the names of the officers or
agency who seized the property, and the name of the judge who issued the warrant, then the
court may easily release the property to the owner. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id., at 683.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:139

demand detailed notice of post-deprivation remedies, but wrote a
concurring opinion because they believe that the Fourth
Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, governs the
execution of a criminal search warrant.50 Justices Thomas and
Scalia expressed willingness, in an appropriate case, to consider
whether notice that property has been seized is required under the
in order to make a search and seizure
Fourth Amendment
"reasonable." 1 The two justices did not agree with the majority's
opinion that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires a law enforcement agency to provide notice of seizure to
the property's owner so that the owner may take steps in finding
available remedies to recover the property 52 The concurring
'justices criticized the majority opinion for applying a procedural
due process analysis to a criminal search and seizure, instead of
relying on the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures.5
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution states that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 4 It
was proposed to the legislatures of the several states by the
thirty-ninth Congress in 1866.15 In 1868, the Secretary of State
declared it a part of the United States Constitution, and declared
that the proposed Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified by the
legislatures of thirty of the thirty-six states.56 The concepts behind
50. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 684 (Thomas, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 685. Thomas based this willingness on an examination of the common law
models for "reasonable" searches under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 685 (citing Wilson v.
Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995)).
52. Id. at 684.
53. Id. Justice Thomas quoted from Gerstein v. Pugh that "[tihe Fourth Amendment
was tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system, and its balance between individual and
public interests always has been thought to define the 'process that is due' for seizures of
person or property in criminal cases." Id. (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125
(1975)). Justice Thomas stated that in his view if the Constitution does impose "a 'notice'
requirement on officers executing a search warrant, it does so because the failure to provide
such notice renders an otherwise-lawful search 'unreasonable' under the Fourth
Amendment." Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 684 (Thomas, J., concurring). He further noted that
Supreme Court precedents suggest that the procedure for executing the common-law
warrant for stolen goods "furnished the model for a 'reasonable' search under the Fourth
Amendment." Id. (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 116; and also citing Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 98
Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763); Entick v. Carington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765); and TELFORD
TAYLoR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTIUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, 82 (1969)).
54. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
55: See Constitution of the United States as printed in Vol. 1 of the United States Code
(1994), page LX III, Proposal and Ratification of Article XIV.
56. Id.
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the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution are
ancient, dating back to chapter 29 of the Magna Carta of 1225.Y7
That provision has been interpreted as protecting "every individual
of the nation in the free enjoyment of his life, liberty and his
property, unless declared to be forfeited by the judgment of his
peers or the law of the land." 8 The procedural safeguards of
protecting life, liberty, and property with due process of law "have
their historical origins in the notion that conditions of personal
freedom can be preserved only when there is some institutional
check on arbitrary government action."59
In the 1903 case of Reetz v. Michigan6° the Supreme Court of the
United States had to decide whether a state statute, which created
a board to determine whether a person was "legally registered" to
practice medicine, conflicted with the Due Process Clause because
there was no provision in the statute for a review of the board's
decision. 61 One of the provisions of the statute stated that an
applicant would be given a certificate of registration if the
applicant could present proof, within six months after the passage
of this statute, that he had already been legally registered under
Act No. 167 of 1883, amended in 1887 ("An act to promote public
health"). 62 Reetz was prosecuted and convicted of a violation of this
57. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 28 (1991) (Scalia. J., concurring).
That important document provides:
No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised [sic] of his Freehold, or
Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor
will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or
by Law of the land.
Id. (citing 9 Hen. m, ch. 29 (1225)). The Supreme Court has analogized due process to the
Magna Carta's "guaranties against the oppressions and usurpations" of the royal prerogative
in support of the basic conclusion that due process "is a restraint on the legislative as well
as on the executive and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to
leave congress [or the states] free to make any 'process due process of law' by its mere
will." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUIONAL LAw § 10-7, at 664 (2nd ed. 1998).
58. Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DuKE LJ. 507, 559 (1991) (citing 1 William Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 233 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803 & photo, reprint
1969)).
59. TRIBE, supra note 57, at 664.
60. 188 U.S. 505 (1903).
61. Reetz, 188 U.S. at 505. The state statute was Act No. 237 of the public acts of the
State of Michigan (1899). Id. This statute appointed "a board of registration in medicine" to
conduct two periodic meetings at the state capitol which "required all persons [engaged] in
the practice of medicine and surgery to obtain from [the] board a certificate of registration."
Id. The statute prohibited the practice of medicine or surgery without such a certificate. Id.
at 506. The statute also provided guidelines for the medical practitioners' qualifications. Id.
62. Id.
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statute, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Michigan.A In
his petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, Reetz
asserted that the creation of such a board, which could render the
final determination of a legal question, was unconstitutional
because an appeal from the final decision of the board was not
permitted.6
After granting certiorari, the Reetz Court first determined that it
is not unusual for a state to authorize a "tribunal, whether called a
court or a board of registration," to make the "final determination
of a legal question."6 Next, the Reetz Court concluded that the
right to appeal is not an essential element of due process. 66 The
Court discussed Reetz's allegations and found that even though the
statute did not provide for notice or a hearing, it did require two
special meetings at the state capitol at specified times.67 The Court
noted that Reetz could have attended these meetings and applied
for a hearing, which the board would then be required to hold.6
The Court concluded that any time a statute fixes the time and
place for a meeting of any tribunal or board, no special notice to
interested parties is required, because the statute itself serves as
69
adequate notice.
In 1950, the United States Supreme Court was confronted with
the issue of whether a New York statute contradicted the due
process notice requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment in
the seminal case of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust.70
Central Hanover Bank created a common trust fund pursuant to
63. Id.
64. Id. at 507.
65. Id. The Court noted that the statute did not "conflict with the state Constitution"
and the Court did not know of any "provision in the Federal Constitution which forbids a
state from granting a tribunal" the right to make the final resolution of a legal question. Id.
66. Reetz, 188 U.S. at 508. The Court noted that in nearly every state criminal case of a
minor nature, defendants are given one trial without a right of review. Id. It further stated
that trials in federal court, "for even the gravest offenses, [have] ended in the trial court,
except in cases where two judges were present and certified a question of law to [the
appellate] court." Id.
67. Id. at 509.
68. Id. Reetz sent his application to the secretary of the board along with a certified
copy of his registration under the prior statute and his diploma from the Independent
Medical College of Chicago, Illinois. Id. The diploma was later returned to him with a notice
that he was denied an application for registration. Id.
69. Id.
70. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The notice issue involved in this case was whether the statute
provided the appropriate notice to beneficiaries of a common trust fund, established in
accordance with the New York Banking Law, upon judicial settlement of the common trust
fund. MuUane, 339 U.S. at 307.
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the New York Banking Law and shortly thereafter "petitioned the
Surrogate's Court for settlement of its first account as [a] common
7
trustee." 1
There were over one hundred beneficiaries of this particular
trust, some of whom were not residents of New York.72 The only
notice these beneficiaries received was publication in a local
newspaper, which was in strict compliance with the minimum
requirements established by the New York Banking Law.73 In
accordance with the notice requirements, the only information set
forth in the newspaper was "the name and address of the trust
company, the name and . . . date of [the] establishment of the
common trust fund, and a list of all of the participating estates,
trusts or funds."74 Mullane appeared before the Surrogate Court
objecting that the notice and statutory requirements were
insufficient to afford due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 75 The Surrogate Court held that the notice required
by the Appellate
and given was adequate, and was affirmed
76
Court.
Supreme
York
New
Division of the
The Supreme Court of the United States needed to determine
whether the notice required by the New York Banking Law, and the
notice given to the beneficiaries by the trust company, satisfied the
71. Mulane, 339 U.S. at 309. During the time of the accounting term, which was
generally 12 to 15 months after the establishment of the common fund, 113 trusts were
involved in this particular common trust fund. Id. The gross capital of this fund totaled
approximately three million dollars. Id. Under the 1944 New York Banking Law, "a trust
company . . . [could] establish a common fund and . . . invest therein the assets of an
unlimited number of estates, trusts or other funds of which it [was] the trustee." Mulane,
339 U.S. at 308-09. This could be accomplished only with authorization from the State
Banking Board, and had to be done within prescribed limits. Id. "Each participating trust
share[d] ratably in the common fund, [however], exclusive management and control [was] in
the trust company as [a] trustee, and neither a fiduciary nor any beneficiary of a
participating trust [was] deemed to have ownership in any particular asset or investment of
this common fund." Id. at 309.
72. Id.
73. Id. The section that established the minimum requirements was the section dealing
with notice. Id. Once the petition was filed for judicial settlement of the account, a notice or
citation addressed generally, without naming all of the interested parties to the common
trust fund, had to be published at least once a week for four successive weeks in a
newspaper designated by the court. Id. at 309-10.
74. Id. However, pursuant to the applicable statutory section, the trust company
notified by mail each person who would be entitled to share in the principal, as long as the
person was of sound mind, full age, and whose name and address were known to the trust
company. Id.
75. Id. at 311. The appellant was Kenneth J. Mullane, who was appointed by the court
as special guardian and attorney for certain persons either known or unknown not otherwise
appearing before the court. Id. at 310.
76. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 311.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:139

due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 77 The
Court began its analysis by noting that the proceeding in question
was one that may deprive beneficiaries of property rights, and
therefore, the notice and hearing involved must meet the
requirements of due process. 78 The Court determined that it must
balance the interest of the state against the individual interest to be
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 79 The definition of this
balancing test was earlier set forth in the 1914 decision in Grannis
8 0 in which
v. Ordean,
the Court held that "[tihe fundamental
requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard."81
The Mullane Court stated that "when notice is a person's due,
process which is a mere gesture is not due process," and that "[tihe
reasonableness and [consequently] the constitutional validity of any
chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is [fairly]
certain to inform those affected."8 2 The opinion noted that it would
be difficult to imagine that publication in a local newspaper alone,
as required by the New York Banking Law, is a reliable means of
notifying the interested parties that their interests are before a
court8 3 The Court held that the notice given to the known
beneficiaries was insufficient because, under the circumstances, the
notice was not reasonably calculated to reach those who could
easily be informed by alternative means.84 The Supreme Court
concluded, "the notice of judicial settlement of accounts required
by the New York Banking Law is incompatible with the
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment."8
The Supreme Court decided a similar issue of the adequacy of
notice by publication in the 1962 case of Schroeder v. City of New
York.8 6 The determination to be made by the Court in Schroeder
77. Id. at 307.
78. Id. at 313.
79. Id. at 314.
80. 234 U.S. 385 (1914).
81. Mu//ane, 339 U.S. at 314 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)). The
Court further noted that "[t]he notice must be of such [a] nature as reasonably to convey the
required information," as well as affording a "reasonable time for those interested to make
their appearance." Id. (citations omitted).
82. Id., at 315.
83. Id. The Court explained that chance alone brings attention to an advertisement, in
small print, in the back of a newspaper, even to a local resident; furthermore, the odds of
someone outside the area seeing the same advertisement are even more reduced. Id. In
addition, the odds are further reduced when the required notice published in the newspaper
does not list the names of the people to whom the advertisement is directed. Id.
84. Id. at 319.
85. Id. at 320.
86. 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
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was "whether the City of New York deprived the appellant of due
process of law by failing to provide adequate notice of
condemnation proceedings" affecting a particular piece of
property.8 7 The City of New York "instituted a proceeding . . . to
acquire the right to divert a portion of the Neversink River
[approximately twenty-five] miles upstream from the [said]
property," pursuant to the New York City Water Act. 8 The Act
required that notice of such condemnation proceedings be
published in two public New York City newspapers, as well as in
two other public newspapers published in the other counties where
89
the property is laid out on a map.

The City followed the required notice procedures and had the
notice of its acquisition published in four newspapers for the
necessary time period and posted twenty-two notices in the general
vicinity of the Schroeder property.90 This controversy arose because
the notice was published in two local newspapers that were
located miles from the Schroeder property and further, the notices
in the general area of the property were posted in the month of
January, when the Schroeder property was vacant.9 1 Schroeder
brought this action asserting that because she had never been
properly notified of the condemnation proceedings, she was
deprived of her property without due process of law.92 The trial
court held that the Water Supply Act's notice requirement was "not
violative of the due process provisions of the Federal and State
Constitutions," and was affirmed by the Appellate Division and the
New York Court of Appeals. 93 Schroeder appealed to the United
94
States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.
The Schroeder Court immediately discussed its holding in
87. Schroeder, 371 U.S. at 208. Schroeder owned a piece of property along the
Neversink River in New York that consisted of a house on three and a half acres of land
which she and her family occupied two summer months of the year. Id. at 208-09.
88. Id. at 209.
89. Id. The notice was also required to be published once a week for, six weeks
immediately previous to the presentation of such petition, as well as requiring that the
corporation counsel post hand bills of the same advertisement in at least 20 obvious places
in the vicinity of the affected real estate. Id.
90. Id. at 210.
91. Id.
92. Schroeder, 371 U.S. at 210-11. A three-year statute of limitations for claiming
damages was prescribed by the Water Supply Act. Id. at 210. Schroeder, however, filed her
claim after the statute of limitations had expired and claimed that she knew nothing about
the condemnation proceedings nor her right to claim against the city for damages to her
property. Id. at 210-11.
93. Id. at 211.
94. Id.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:139

Mullane and reemphasized that the requirement that parties be
notified of proceedings affecting their legally protected rights is one
of the most fundamental requisites of due process.9 5 The Court
further examined Mullane and concluded that the general rule
established in that case was that "notice by publication is not
enough with respect to a person whose name and address are
known or very easily attainable and whose legally protected
interests are directly affected by the proceedings in question. "96 The
Schroeder Court concluded that the City was constitutionally
responsible for making a good faith effort to give the information
personally to Schroeder, and reversed the judgment of the lower
courts.

97

In the 1976 case of Mathews v. Eldridge,98 the Supreme Court
provided further guidance for the analysis of alleged due process
violations.9 9 The Mathews Court determined that an analysis of
alleged due process violation required the weighing of three
"specific dictates of due process." 10 0 The three dictates to be
considered are:
First the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, as well as, the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
protections; and finally, the Government's interest, including
the function involved plus the fiscal and administrative
burdens the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail. 10 1
In the 1978 case of Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division v.
Craft,10 2 the Supreme Court dealt with two issues: (1) whether the
95. Schroeder, 371 U.S. at 212 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. 306). The Court states that
"[t]his right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is
pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest."
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
96. Schroeder, 371 U.S. at 212-13 (citing Mulane, 339 U.S. at 318).
97. Schroeder, 371 U.S. at 214. The Court noted that, had the city mailed a simple
letter, the due process requirements would have been satisfied. Id.
98. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
99. Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 17.
100. Id. The Mathews Court based the three factors on prior decisions of the Supreme
Court. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
101. Id.
102. 436 U.S. 1 (1978). The respondents brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
pursue declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, against the municipal utility and
many of their officers and employees for termination of utility service professedly without
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153

termination of service policies of a municipal utility constituted
"state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) if so,
whether the termination of service for nonpayment deprives the
customer of "property" within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause. 1°3 The Supreme Court quoted from its decision in Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust, °4 "[a]n elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is
to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections." 0 5 The Court examined the narrow issue of whether
due process required that a municipal utility notify the customer of
an available procedure for redress, within the organization, should
he wish to contest a particular charge. 1°6 The Court noted that the
due process of law. Id. at 3. They had moved into a home that had once been used as a
duplex. Id. at 4. There were two sets of gas and electric meters; however, based on the
information the seller had provided, the additional set of meters were not used. Id. Shortly
after moving in, respondents began receiving two sets of bills; however, one bill had a
different middle initial from that of the respondent and the other bill had the correct middle
initial Id. When respondents realized that both meters were being read, they hired a private
plumber and electrician to consolidate the meters into one electric meter and one gas meter.
Id. Unbeknownst to them, the consolidation of the meters was done incorrectly and they
continued to receive two bills, during which time their service was stopped on five different
occasions for nonpayment Id. On several occurrences the respondents attempted, to no
avail, to correct the problem at the utility company's office; however, they were never
properly instructed on how to speak with a member of management to resolve the problem.
Id. at 5.
103. Id. at 7. The Supreme Court also needed to resolve whether the utility company's
procedures afforded due process of law in this case. Id. The case originally began as a class
action suit; however, the district court refused to certify the plaintiff's class and entered
judgment in favor of the defendants. Id. at 5. The district court still addressed the issue of
procedural due process and stated that respondents were not afforded sufficient notice of a
process to discuss the disputed bill with management; however, that insufficiency did not
lead to deprivation of an opportunity to be heard. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit would not certify the class either, although it did reverse the district court in part
and find that the procedures described by respondents had not complied with due process.
Id. at 7.
104. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
105. Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 13 (citing Muliane, 339 U.S. at 314).
106. Id. The notice the respondents may have received was an information flyer
apportioned to about 40 percent of the utility's customers residing in areas with available
"credit counseling stations." Id. That flyer stated that if one was having trouble with their
bill, they could bring it to the neighborhood credit counselors. Id. There was no mention,
however, of a procedure to begin if there was a discrepancy. Id. Another flyer went out to
their customers in the remaining areas, which stated: "[i]f you are having trouble paying your
utility bill and would like to discuss a utility payment plan, or if there is a any dispute
concerning the amount due, BRING YOUR BILL TO THE OFFICE AT..., OR PHONE . . ."
Id. The Court of Appeals stated that there was no way to tell whether respondents "were
mailed" the second flyer by the utility company. Id. It was also clear to the district court, by
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intent of the Due Process Clause is to advise the interested person,
10 7
and to allow for ample preparation of, an approaching "hearing."
The type of notice respondents received did not comport with the
constitutional regulations of due process, when the notice given did
not advise the customer of the availability of a procedure for
disputing an imminent termination of utility service.10 8 Because
respondents received no such proper notice, they were deprived of
the "notice which was their due."1 9
In 1984, the Supreme Court held that food stamp recipients were
not deprived of due process of law when they were not provided
with detailed, individual notice of reduced food stamp benefits in
Atkins v. Parker.1° The Department of Agriculture issued
regulations in 1981 that directed a reduction in the "earned-income
disregard""' and also directed the states to notify food-stamp
recipients of the change.1 2 The Department of Agriculture
suggested that "the form of the notice might comply with the
regulations dealing with so-called 'mass changes,' rather than [with]
the regulations dealing with individual 'adverse actions."' 3 The
Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare ("Department") then
mailed a "card" to all Massachusetts food stamps recipients with
earned income, notifying them that a change in federal law would
result in either a change or termination of their benefits, and that if
they disagreed with the action, they had the right to request a
hearing.1"

4

An action, commenced on behalf of all Massachusetts households
who received the notice, alleged that the notice was insufficient as
a matter of law."5 The district court deemed the "notice was
the good faith put forward by the respondents to resolve the matter, that they were not
sufficiently notified of any procedures allegedly available to them at the time. Id. at 14.
107. Id. at 14.
108. Id. at 14-15.
109. Id. at 15.
110. 472 U.S. 115 (1985). In 1981, Congress had amended the Food Stamp Act to
reduce from 20 percent to 18 percent the earned-income disregard used in determining
eligibility for food stamps. Id. at 118. The amendment would not effect those with little to no
income; however, to those whose income bordered on ineligibility, the effect could cause a
complete termination of benefits. Id.
111. Atkins, 472 U.S. at 118. "Prior to 1981, federal law provided that 20 percent of the
household's earned income should be deducted, or disregarded, in computing eligibility. The
purpose of the earned-income disregard was to maintain the recipients' incentive to earn and
to report income." Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 118-19.
114. Id. at 119.
115. Id. at 119-20.
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deficient in that it failed to provide recipients with a date to
determine the time in which they could appeal."" 6 The Department
then mailed a second notice in adherence with the district court's
injunction prohibiting the reduction or termination of benefits
under the first notice, which was also challenged as insufficient
notice." 7 The district court concluded that both notices violated the
Fourteenth Amendment based on the fact that the termination of
benefits was a clear deprivation of property under the Due Process
Clause, and therefore required very detailed notice."18 The district
court ordered the reinstatement of benefits, and ordered that all
future food stamp notices regarding a change in the law contain
certain detailed information." 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed
the district court's finding that the notice was constitutionally
insufficient. 20 However, the First Circuit modified the district
court's remedy of "reinstat[ing] ... benefits and ... specifying the
form of future notices. " 12' The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari to review "the Court of Appeals' modification of
the District Court's remedy" and to review the notice requirements
under the Food Stamp Act.'2
The Supreme Court first reviewed the notice requirements under
the Food Stamp Act "because there would be no need to decide the
constitutional question" if it found a violation of the statute."23 The
Food Stamp Act included a section that required a state plan to
grant a fair hearing for a household adversely affected by the
action of the state agency. 2 4 The Court determined that the
116. Atkins, 472 U.S. at 120.
117. Id. at 121. The second notice stated that if the recipients had concerns regarding
the "correctness of [their] benefits computation," they could contact the local welfare office
and file an appeal at any time they feel they are not receiving the correct amount of food
stamps. Id. at 121.
118. Id. at 121-22. The district court held that both notices were inadequate because
they failed to advise each household of the exact change to its benefits, as well as the
information necessary to allow the recipient to estimate the correct change. Id. at 121. Both
notices also failed to inform recipients whether their benefits were being reduced or
terminated, and in addition, the district court found the language level and format of the
notices difficult to understand. Id. To correct these failures, the district court ordered the
Department to return to each household involved in the action all food-stamp benefits lost as
a result of the Department's original action. Id. at 122.
119. Id. at 122.
120. Id. at 122-23.
121. Atkins, 472 U.S. at 122-23.
122. Id. at 123.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 123-24. A subsection states that any household that requests a timely

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:139

language of the statute indicated that Congress presumed that
individual notice is an element of the fair hearing requirement, but
concluded that Congress did not intend to require detailed
individual notice when there is a general change in the law. 125 The
original notice the Department sent was found to be compliant
with the applicable statutory requirements because it complied with
the statutory requirement of individual notice of a change in the
126
law; further detail is unnecessary.
The Court then needed to address the claim that the recipients
had a constitutional right to an individual notice of the specific
impact the change would have on them.127 Each recipient who
contacted the Department received a fair hearing before any loss of
benefits had occurred; therefore, the Court concluded that the
Department's conduct was constitutionally appropriate. 128 Justice
Stevens, who delivered the opinion of the Court, closed by stating
that "[t]he entire structure of our democratic government rests on
the premise that the individual citizen is capable of informing
himself about the particular policies that affect his destiny. To
contend that this notice was constitutionally insufficient is to reject
129
that premise."
Many actions for post-seizure claims are brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,130 which was originally part of the Civil Rights Act of
hearing is to continue to receive the same level of benefits as it did prior to the notice, until
the hearing is completed. Id. at 124.
125. Id. The Court looked at the legislative history, which revealed that the original act
in 1964 did not contain a fair hearing provision; however, the statute was amended in 1971
to include a fair hearing provision. Id. at 124-25. In 1977, the statute was amended again and

drew a distinction between the requirement of advance notice of an "adverse action" based
on a particular case, and the absence of any requirement of an individual notice of a "mass
change." Id. The Court concluded that Congress did not intend to eliminate that distinction,
and the Court therefore could not fairly construe the statute to require individual notice of a
general change in the law. Id. at 125-26.
126. Atkins, 472 U.S. at 126. The applicable regulation is TItle 7 C.FR. §
273.12(e)(2)(ii), which provides:
A notice of adverse action is not required when a household's food stamp benefits are
reduced or terminated as a result of a mass change in the public assistance grant.
However, State agencies shall send individual notice to households to inform them of
the change. If a household requests a fair hearing, benefits shall be continued at the
former level only if the issue being appealed is that the food stamp eligibility or
benefits were improperly computed.
7 C.FR. § 273.12(e)(2)(ii) (1984).
127. Atkins, 472 U.S. at 127.
128. Id. at 128.
129. Id. at 131.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
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1871.131 The 1961 decision in the United States Supreme Court case
Monroe v. Pape' 32 brought 42 U.S.C. § 1983 into the forefront of
1 The Monroe Court considered whether
federal civil rights actions.'3
Congress enacted R.S. § 19793 4 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, to
privileges
give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights,
135
position.
his
of
abuse
official's
an
by
immunities
and
The petitioners in Monroe alleged that early one morning,
thirteen Chicago police officers broke into their home. 136 The
officers forced them from their bed, unclothed, into the living room
and as they stood there, the officers ravaged every room. 137 The
petitioners further complained that Mr. Monroe was taken to the
police station and held on 'open' charges for ten hours while being
questioned with regard to a two-day-old murder. 13 Consequently, he
39
was released without criminal charges being filed against him.'
The City of Chicago moved to dismiss on grounds that the
complaint stated no viable cause of action under the Civil Rights
Acts.140 The district court dismissed the complaint, and was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.' 4 ' The Supreme Court granted
court
certiorari because the decisions in the district court and the
42
of appeals conflicted with prior Supreme Court decisions.
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
131. R.S. § 1979 is from Act Apr. 20, 1871, c. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)).
132. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Department of Social
Services of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
133. Rodney A. Smolla, The Displacement of FederalDue Process Claims by State Tort
Remedies: Parrattv. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 1982 U. ILL L REv.
831.
134. R.S. § 1979 is from Act Apr. 20, 1871, c. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)).
135. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172.
136. Id. at 169.
137. Id. The officers apparently emptied every drawer and ripped mattress covers. Id.
138. Id. Mr. Monroe was neither taken before a magistrate, although one was available,
nor was he permitted to use a telephone to call his family or an attorney. Id.
139. Id.
140. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 170.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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The Supreme Court began its analysis by outlining the three
goals that the Civil Rights Act hoped to achieve: (1) "to override
certain kinds of state laws;" (2) to provide "a remedy where state
law was inadequate;" and (3) "to provide a federal remedy where
the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in
practice."'14 The Court noted that Congress' intent in passing the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 was to control the Ku Klux Klan.' 4
In 1981, Parratt v. Taylor 45 became a major decision in cases
involving § 1983 because it redefined the consequential issue of
creating a claim using that section, without altering the prior
analyses. 46 The case involved an inmate, Taylor, who ordered
hobby materials while incarcerated, which were delivered to the
143. Id. at 174. Senator Edmunds, chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
said in regard to the legislation:
The first section is one I believe nobody objects to, as defining the rights secured by
the Constitution of the United States when they are assailed by any State law or
under color of any State law, and it is merely carrying out the principles of the civil
rights bill, which has since become part of the Constitution, viz., the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171. The Court noted that the purpose of this Act is clear from the title
of the legislation, "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes." Id. (citing 17 Stat. 13).
144. Id. at 172-173. The Ku Klux Klan Act grew from a message to Congress by
President Grant on March 23, 1871:
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union rendering life and
property insecure and the carrying of the mails and the collection of the revenue
dangerous. The proof that such a condition of affairs exists in some localities is now
before the Senate. That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control of the
State authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the Executive of the United States,
acting within limits of existing laws, is sufficient for present emergencies is not clear.
Therefore, I urgently recommend such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall
effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of
the United States.
Id. at 172-73. This was not a remedy against the Ku Klux Klan or its members, but rather a
remedy against those who represented a state, in some function, who were unable or
unwilling to enforce a state law. Id. at 175-76. Senator Osborne, who represented Florida,
stated:
That the State courts in the several States have been unable to enforce the criminal
laws of their respective States or to suppress the disorders existing, and in fact that
the preservation of life and property in many sections of the country is beyond the
power of the State government, is a sufficient reason why Congress should, so far as
they have authority under the Constitution, enact the laws necessary for the
protection of citizens of the United States.
Id. at 176.
145. 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327 (1986).
146. Timothy M. Maggio, Parratt v. Taylor: Limitations on the Parratt Analysis in
Section 1983 Actions, 59 NoTRE DAME L REv. 1388, 1389 (1984).

1999

City of West Covina v. Perkins

prison complex and signed for by two employees. 147 Taylor was in
segregation at the time the hobby materials were delivered.'4 Upon
his release from segregation, he contacted several prison officials
regarding the location of his package, who told him that his
package was unexplainably lost.1M9 Taylor claimed that petitioners'
negligent conduct in losing his package deprived him of property
without due process law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 150
Therefore, the ParrattCourt addressed whether respondent had
been deprived of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States.'5' The Court immediately turned
its attention to whether the Nebraska tort remedies for property
deprivation satisfied the requirements of procedural due process,
considering that the Fourteenth Amendment only protects against
deprivations without due process of law. 52 After briefly discussing
several cases, the Court concluded that all of those cases
recognized that
either the necessity of quick action by the State or the
impracticality of providing any meaningful predeprivation
process, when coupled with the availability of some
meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of the
State's action at some time after the initial taking, can satisfy
the requirements of procedural due process.'5
Because Taylor's property was negligently lost, the state could not
foresee the deprivation in order to provide a predeprivation
hearing. 15
The Parratt Court also relied upon Bonner v. Coughlin,'5 a
similar case, which supported its conclusion that Taylor had not
alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause, even though he had
147. Parratt,451 U.S. at 529-30. The hobby materials Taylor ordered were valued at
$23.50. Id.
148. Id. at 530.
149. Id.
150. Id. Taylor chose to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even though Nebraska had a
tort claims procedure that provided a remedy to persons who suffered tortious losses at the
hands of the State. Id.
151. Id. at 536-37. Taylor's claim met the three conditions of a valid due process claim
because the prison acted under the color of state law, the hobby kit fits the definition of
property, and even though the loss was negligent, it still constituted a deprivation. Id.
152. Parratt,451 U.S. at 537.
153. Id. at 539.
154. Id.
155. 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
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been deprived of property under color of state law, because his
deprivation was not the result of an "established state
procedure."' 56 Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the opinion of the
ParratCourt, concluded that the state remedies available to Taylor
through a state statute granting a cause of action for the "tortious
loss [of property] at the hands of the State" were adequate to
satisfy the requirements of due process.15 7 The decision redefined
what constitutes a deprivation of a property interest without due
process of law by requiring the exhaustion of state remedies before
an allegation that due process rights have been violatedlss
The issue to be decided by the Supreme Court in the 1984 case
of Hudson v. Palmer159 was whether its decision in Parratt,"that a
negligent deprivation of property by state officials does not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment if an adequate postdeprivation state
remedy exists," 16° should extend to intentional deprivations of
property.16 Palmer claimed that he was intentionally deprived of
personal property while incarcerated. 162 The district court relied on
Parratt in that, although Palmer's property was destroyed
intentionally, there was no Fourteenth Amendment violation
because there were adequate state remedies available to redress
the deprivation. 1' The court of appeals agreed with the district
court that Palmer was not deprived of his property without due
process of law; however, it affirmed in part, and reversed in part.'6
The Supreme Court held, after analyzing Parratt, that an
156. Parratt,451 U.S. at 54142. Instead, Taylor's "deprivation occurred as a result of
the unauthorized failure of agents of the State to follow established state procedure." Id. at
543.
157. Id. at 543-44.
158. Maggio, supra note 146, at 1390.
159. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
160. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 519.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 520. Palmer, a prisoner, alleged that Hudson, a prison guard, had conducted
a shakedown search of his cell and accused and charged him falsely with the intent to
harass him. Id. Palmer also alleged that Hudson had deliberately destroyed particular items
of his non-contraband property, which Palmer claimed violated his Fourteenth Amendment
right not to be deprived of property without due process of law. Id. Hudson disputed each of
the accusations and moved for summary judgment, which the Court granted. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. The court of appeals agreed that the rationale behind Parrattapplies equally
to unauthorized intentional deprivations of property by state officials and stated that "[o]nce
it is assumed that a post-deprivation remedy can cure an unintentional but negligent act
causing injury, inflicted by a state agent which is unamenable to prior review, then that
principle applies as well to random and unauthorized intentional acts." Id. at 520-21.
However, the court of appeals held that the shakedown search was unreasonable. Id. at
521-22.

1999

City of West Covina v. Perkins

unauthorized, intentional deprivation of property by a state
employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural
prerequisites of the Due Process Clause, as long as a post
deprivation remedy is accessible. 65
In Perkins, the Supreme Court held that due process does not
require the state to provide explicit instructions to someone
attempting to retrieve their property that was lawfully seized, yet
no longer needed for a police investigation. As an alternative
analysis, in light of the fact that Perkins did not exhaust all
available state remedies, he was not deprived of due process.
Perkins was premature in his suit, considering that he had made
only one failed attempt to recover his property at the courthouse.
Some available state remedies that Perkins did not pursue include
providing the court clerk with his address in order to obtain the
correct search warrant number, or filing a tort claim against the
police.
The Supreme Court's holding in Perkins does not preclude a
state from providing detailed post-seizure instructions.- In fact, it is
possible that a state may determine that the due process rights
under the state constitution require detailed notice of post-seizure
remedies. It is also possible, though not likely, that the Supreme
Court will decide in a future case that the Fourth Amendment
requires detailed post-seizure instructions in order for the seizure
to be reasonable, even though such instructions are not required
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Perkins Court held that when state law remedies are published and
commonly available as state statutes and case law, owners of
seized property must turn to these sources to obtain instructions
for the retrieval of the seized property.' 66 This rationale seems
rather unrealistic, given the specialized legal knowledge required to
research statutes and case law in order to have actual knowledge
of post-seizure remedies. The court may find in the future that
under the Fourth Amendment, it is unreasonable that people
seeking the return of their seized property would have the
awareness to search their state statutes or case law pertaining to
the retrieval of the seized property. Perhaps the Court should at
least recognize the inefficiency of imputing to the general public
the knowledge of post-seizure remedies that are contained in
165. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. This meant that for intentional and negligent deprivations
of property by state employees, the state action would not be complete until and unless it
provides or refuses to provide an adequate post deprivation solution. Id.
166. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 681-82.
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statutes and case law.
Perkins does not change the way that post deprivation cases are
determined under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. There has not yet been a case holding that due
process rights require the police to provide notice of all of the
available state law remedies to a person who wants to retrieve
property lawfully seized, yet no longer needed for an investigation.
Due process does require, however, that law enforcement agents
take reasonable steps in order to provide notice that the property
has been seized so that the owner can pursue the remedies
available to regain the property. Perkins was not deprived due
process because he did not exhaust his state remedies and
therefore the Supreme Court was correct in its holding.
Emily L. Dimperio

